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Analysis: China's ability on Taiwan island
Hong Kong (UPI) Oct 19, 2007 Although there is little possibility that a real armed confrontation would break out in the Taiwan Strait, China's verbal threats and combat preparations indicate that the People's Liberation Army is preparing to take control of Taiwan's offshore islands should an emergency arise. Judging from advances in China's combat equipment, the PLA's capability to attack the offshore islands is in fact growing much stronger. Sources in Chinese military circles claim that during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, when China shot missiles over the island to send a warning ahead of presidential elections, China had also formulated a plan to take over one of the small islands of Jinmen or Matsu. The Taiwan Strait confrontation that took place in 1958 had involved mainly these offshore islands, but the battles there affected the overall situation in the strait. As a deterrence strategy, the Chinese forces now seem to be focusing on taking control of the Penghu Islands. For this purpose China has developed a new generation of large long-range landing equipment, including its own versions of expeditionary fighting vehicles and heavy hovercraft. The development of a WS multiple-launch rocket system is also obviously targeted at the Penghu Islands. When the Chinese media discuss issues involving combat operations against Taiwan, they primarily focus on launching an offensive against the Penghu Islands. The official press has described the Penghu Islands as "a natural bridge for attacking a more difficult target." The state press has also reported that the Qing Dynasty united Taiwan by taking over the Penghus first, then forcing Taiwan to surrender. Seizing the Penghu Islands would rip a hole in Taiwan's defenses, the theory goes. China's military objectives in bombarding Jinmen Island in 1958 were to contain the forces on Taiwan Island and to wipe out those on or near the offshore islands. Nowadays, a bombardment of the small islands could reduce the pressure for a landing operation against Taiwan Island proper. There are few important facilities and only a small population on the offshore islands, making it easier to launch firepower attacks without causing huge personnel casualties on both sides. Such an action would send political shockwaves to Taiwan Island and could foment change among Taiwan's political factions, however. The 1996 plan to launch an offensive against one of the small Jinmen Islands was supposed to accomplish the same objective. Militarily, an offensive operation against the Penghu Islands may put the Taiwanese forces stationed in that region in an unfavorable position. First, it would be easier for the Chinese forces to concentrate their firepower, especially artillery firepower, there. Second, the strengths of the forces of the two sides in this region are of a much greater disparity than on Taiwan Island itself. At present, the combat units stationed on the main Penghu Island include the 503rd Armored Brigade, armed with M60A3 main battle tanks, one Marine battalion, the "Tien Gong" ground-to-air missile unit, the 168th Garrison Brigade, and sometimes an IDF Fighter Squadron. The ground force units are equipped with very formidable artillery firepower. They have 155 mm howitzers, different types of mortar guns, M60A3 tanks and 8,000 troops. In the coming five years the following factors will determine whether Penghu will come under greater threat: First, the range of the PLA forces' artillery firepower can already cover Penghu and the region. The PLA has developed a whole series of long-range artillery systems, including the 180-kilometer and 200-kilometer range WS1B and WS2 multiple-launch rocket systems, which Taiwan has never faced in the past. In addition, the 100-kilometer range A100 multiple-launch rocket system is already in service in the artillery units of PLA No. 42 Group Army based in Guangdong province, while the WS1B and WS2 are mainly intended for export at the moment. In the air, since H-6H bombers are now armed with YJ-63 cruise missiles, the Chinese air force can implement the combat strategy of launching long-range assaults upon Penghu, particularly upon the positions of the Tien Gong ground-to-air missiles. Large hovercraft and China's expeditionary fighting vehicles may also enter full service in the combat forces within the coming five years, which will enable them to carry out beyond-vision landing operations. This also means that the EFVs could start launching waves of attacks upon Penghu Island from 40 kilometers away. At such a distance, the Chinese forces would be outside striking range of Taiwan's firepower deployed on the Island, and only Taiwan's tactical air force and missile swift boats would have the capability to attack the Chinese fleets launching standoff landing assaults. The balance of power between the air forces and missile boat fleets of the two sides is severely tilted in favor of the mainland. The heavy Chinese hovercraft can directly launch cross-water assaults upon Penghu Island. Once the ground-to-air missiles and air defense firepower on Penghu are attacked and severely damaged by missiles from the air and by the ground-based rockets, the PLA air force's airborne troops will encounter much less difficulty in airdropping onto the island than they would if they attempted to land on Taiwan Island proper. This is why the Taiwanese forces regularly practice anti-airdrop tactics in their annual war games. More critically, once a large-scale fight for the control of Penghu Island breaks out, it is very likely that more forces would have to be dispatched from Taiwan Island to reinforce the Penghu battlefront. That would be what China wants most, as it would give the Chinese forces the opportunity to eliminate the enemy forces on or around the offshore islands and further weaken the overall defense of Taiwan. Once Penghu is lost, Taiwan Island itself will be in greater danger than ever. The application of modern weapon technologies, especially the application of the Chinese EFVs and heavy hovercraft, can make Penghu Island a critical stepping-stone for the Chinese forces to launch amphibious attacks on the southern part of Taiwan Island. In the 40 kilometer-per-hour Chinese EFVs it would take less than 60 minutes to cross the Taiwan Strait from Penghu. The shortest distance between Penghu and Taiwan Island is only 50 kilometers, which means Taiwan is within the operational range of the Chinese version EFVs. Moreover, the A-100 multiple-launch rocket guns deployed on Penghu could directly fire at Taiwan Island. The only remaining question would be the weather conditions. (Andrei Chang is editor in chief of Kanwa Defense Review.) Community Email This Article Comment On This Article Related Links China News from SinoDaily.com
Bush Defies China In Very Public Meeting With Dalai Lama
Washington (AFP) Oct 17, 2007President George W. Bush Wednesday defied China's fury as he became the first US leader to appear in public with the Dalai Lama, and called on Beijing to abandon "religious repression." |
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